Overview
We checked each control below against the software itself. Of 25 controls, 13 are implemented, 7 are partial and 5 are planned.
- Implemented
- Partial
- Planned
Deployment review required. Before serving families, the center must configure its identity, storage, encryption, consent, monitoring and recovery services and verify each required control in the environment where HomeWork House will run.
Access
| Control | Status |
|---|---|
| Role-based access, enforced on the serverStaff can only reach their own center, and teachers only their own classrooms. Family accounts can only reach the children linked to them. Every request is checked by the server; hiding a button is never the only protection. | Implemented |
| Per-child family permissionsThe permission to see reports and activities is enforced. The "authorised for pickup" flag is stored and shown but is not yet enforced at check-out. | Partial |
| Production sign-in (single sign-on, passwords, multi-factor)Production verifies signed, issuer- and audience-bound OIDC identities and disables development sign-in. The selected identity provider still needs production configuration, account linking, recovery, multi-factor authentication and revocation evidence before launch. | Partial |
| Family invitationsInvitation links are single-use, expire after 14 days, only work for the invited email address, and are stored only as a one-way hash. | Implemented |
| Application linksThe private application link is a 256-bit random value. Only its hash is stored; it expires after 30 days and replacement makes the old link stop working. | Implemented |
| Development sign-in disabled in productionIn a production build the development sign-in and sign-up routes respond as if they do not exist, and a forged session cookie is ignored. | Implemented |
Data protection
| Control | Status |
|---|---|
| No card or bank-account numbers storedOnly opaque tokens from a deployment-configured payment provider can be saved. Anything shaped like a card or account number is rejected by both the form and the server. Whether payments are enabled depends on the operator deployment and its published provider list. | Implemented |
| Answer keys stay on the serverQuiz answers and tracing scores are calculated on the server, so a child’s browser never receives the answer key. | Implemented |
| Health information kept in a separate encrypted recordAllergies and medical notes live in their own encrypted table. Routine operational screens and APIs do not return them; a reviewed requester-only privacy export is the narrow exception. | Implemented |
| Encryption in transit (HTTPS)The application does not terminate TLS itself. The hosting environment must serve it over HTTPS; this is a deployment requirement, not something this code provides. | Planned |
| Encryption at rest and field-level encryptionDatabase and object-storage encryption depend on the selected hosts. The code includes tenant- and record-bound authenticated field encryption with AWS KMS-wrapped data keys and rotation support. Launch still requires a real KMS key policy, provider configuration, audit evidence and migration or backfill of existing health records. | Partial |
| No advertising or third-party trackingThe application contains no advertising code, analytics scripts or social-media trackers. Fonts are served from the same site. | Implemented |
Abuse protection
| Control | Status |
|---|---|
| Strict input validationEvery endpoint validates its input against a schema and rejects anything unexpected, including oversized values. | Implemented |
| Spam and abuse limits on public formsPublic forms use hidden trap fields, strict size limits and an atomic Redis-backed per-address limiter in production. Requests fail closed when the shared limiter is unavailable. Deployment still needs a protected Redis service and monitoring. | Implemented |
| Safe retries for money and messagesPayments, invoices, messages and learning results are idempotent and protected with row locks, so a double click or a flaky network cannot double-charge or duplicate a record. | Implemented |
Auditability
| Control | Status |
|---|---|
| History of important actionsApplication stage changes, published plans and billing runs are recorded with who and when, and billing runs keep a snapshot of what was billed. There is no general access log of who viewed what. | Partial |
| Access logging and unusual-activity alertsScheduled for a future release. | Planned |
Children & consent
| Control | Status |
|---|---|
| Children do not create accounts or share personal detailsIn learner mode a child traces shapes, picks answers and types practice text that is shown to them. There is no free-text input, chat, photo, voice or location collection. Practice results store scores and effort measures, not the child’s keystrokes. | Implemented |
| Parents can see their child’s informationThe family portal shows the daily report, activities and messages for each linked child. | Implemented |
| Photo consent and private media boundaryImage and video uploads enforce the child’s consent flag, remain private, and are not downloadable until marked ready. Launch still requires a configured malware scanner, approved consent records and an operator workflow for withdrawal and deletion. | Partial |
| Verifiable parental consent workflowNot currently available. The center must obtain and keep parental consent itself before using HomeWork House for a child. | Planned |
| Data export, correction and deletion requestsSigned-in families can submit persisted requests. Staff review them with center-scoped access; approved exports use time-limited requester-only downloads, approved corrections use a strict field allow-list, and eligible deletion is queued with retention and legal-hold checks. Launch still requires configured storage, workers, notifications and a rehearsed operator process. | Partial |
Operations
| Control | Status |
|---|---|
| Scheduled retention deletionApproved privacy-request deletions can be processed by the privacy worker, but records are not yet selected automatically when their retention period ends. Expired invitations stop working but their records remain. See the retention page for the schedule centers are expected to follow. | Planned |
| Backups and disaster recoveryThe repository includes deployment, rollback and restoration procedures. Backup/PITR configuration and a timed restore drill depend on the production providers and have not been evidenced. | Partial |
| Independent security assessment or certificationNone. No penetration test, SOC 2 report or similar certification exists for this software. | Planned |
What we do not claim
- No third-party security audit, penetration test, SOC 2 report or ISO certification exists for this software.
- We do not claim compliance with any specific law or standard. See the notes on children's privacy.
- We make no promise about hosting, uptime, encryption or backups. Those depend on where the operator runs the software.
Protecting your account
- Treat links like passwords. Application and invitation links let whoever holds them act on that family's behalf. Don't forward or post them.
- Sign out on shared devices, such as a classroom tablet, and don't leave a session open.
- Use the invited email address when you create your account. An invitation only works for that address.
- Be wary of requests for money or card numbers. HomeWork House never asks a family to type a card or bank number into a message, and centers must not ask for one in the app.
- Tell your center right away if a device is lost or you think someone else saw your information.
Reporting a problem
If you believe you have found a security problem, please report it to [email protected] with enough detail to reproduce it. Please don't access other people's information or disrupt the service while investigating. We will acknowledge reports and fix confirmed problems; there is no bug-bounty program.